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Introduction
Pure altruism is well known in economics as one major driver of providing several forms of public good: charitable giving, volunteering, and blood donations 1 . Andreoni has defined that an individual with pure altruism increases their personal utility when the utility level of others rises 2, 3, 4 . a For example, in blood donations, when a certain amount of blood is transfused to a person who needs it, the recipient of the blood becomes pleased.
In this situation, a purely altruistic individual feels happier as a result of the recipient's
pleasure. An interesting point here is that a rise in their purely altruistic utility does not depend on who gives the blood to the recipient. They simply feel happy, not only when they, themselves, donate enough of their blood to a recipient to improve his/her health, but when they know that the other blood donors also donate as well.
If your privately-provided public good has a large number of potential recipients, does it influence your behavior of providing the public good? Imagine that a natural disaster has occurred and that you are planning to donate one box of crayons to a child in a Andreoni writes the utility function of a purely altruistic individual in the following way: , , where is the payoff of the individual and is that of the other individual. The function includes not only the individual's payoff but also the other's payoff. Therefore, their utility is affirmatively correlated with the other's payoff. the affected area. In this case, the number of people who have the possibility to receive the box of crayons, the potential recipients, is the total number of children in the area. On the other hand, if you decide to make a monetary donation, the number of potential recipients increases, because such a monetary donation can be delivered not only to children but to adults. Thus, different forms of public goods have different numbers of potential recipients.
Does the knowledge that your private donation has a large number of potential recipients cause you to give more or less? This study considers this question, seeking to determine the answer by empirically examining how blood type affects blood-donation behaviors. The range of blood transfusion recipients differs widely across blood type, and this unique feature facilitates a natural experiment for our investigation.
More precisely, individuals with the blood types A, B, or AB can provide transfusions only for those with the same blood type. In this sense, these three types of blood are a local public good, as the benefit is limited to a particular area or population 5 .
A suitable analogy to this is a city library, to which only city residents have access. In contrast, O type blood can be medically transfused to individuals of all blood groups, as mentioned in the guidelines of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in Japan 6 .
b
Thus, blood type O represents a local public good with a broader range of blood transfusion recipients than the other blood types, as shown in Figure 1 .
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Blood type O's unique usability naturally means that it has a much larger number of potential recipients than the other blood types. Here we assume for our investigation that the probability of people requiring a blood transfusion (e.g., the likelihood of their encountering an accident) is identical for each individual and that the quantity of transfused blood is also identical for each individual, on average. Furthermore, we assume that people recognize potential recipients of their blood as members of the same group and that they experience their personal utility gain from these members' happiness if they have purely altruistic motivation.
Under these assumptions, widening the range of blood transfusion recipients means increasing the number of group members who require a blood transfusion b In "Guidelines on Implementation of Transfusion Therapy", The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare mentions the following: when there is no time to clarify the blood type of a patient due to hemorrhagic shock, when there is no determination reagent for blood type at emergency, or when it is difficult to clarify the blood type for to any other reasons, a red O type blood concentrate for which a cross-matching test has not been conducted can be used.
increasing the total quantity of transfused blood and, as a consequence, increasing the social surplus.
c Andreoni theorized how behaviors concerning the provision of a public good are influenced by the increase in social surplus due to the increase in the number of people (n) receiving the benefits of the public good 7 . First, a positive (income) effect occurs: as the number of recipients (n) increases, the provided good generates more social benefits, and people become more likely to provide the public good. Second, a negative (crowding out) effect occurs: as the number of donors also increases, the same social benefit can be attained at a lower cost, and people become less likely to provide the public good.
Although Andreoni showed in a laboratory experiment that the income effect exceeds the crowding out effect 7 , in the case of blood donation behaviors, identifying which effect dominates depends on empirical analysis. This study's purposes are as follows: (1) we investigated the differences in blooddonation behaviors between the people with blood type O and those with other blood types and (2) if we were able to identify a different pattern of blood donation behavior c We rewrote the basic utility function of a purely altruistic individual in the following way: , , where is the number of group members. The purely altruistic utility gain changes, as its number changes.
from the people with blood type O, we investigated whether the cause of such behavior was due to the fact that blood type O is a public good with a larger number of potential recipients than the other blood types.
The literature empirically has indicated the possibility that stimulating nonaltruistic motivation promotes an individual's blood donation behavior 8,9,10 . However, these results have not demonstrated the non-existence of a blood donation behavior caused by purely altruistic motivation. Also, if some proportions of purely altruistic blood donors were provided with a non-altruistic incentive, it could impede their blood donation behavior 11 . Taking these results into account, it is essential to directly test whether pure altruism motivates an individual's blood donation behavior.
Methods

Data Description
To conduct our investigation, we used a dataset from a nationally representative survey By using the PPSOU dataset, we were able to address the above concern directly. The PPSOU survey is based on the concepts of behavioral economics, and the survey purpose is to identify the validity of the conventional economics assumptions that people are rational and seek to maximize their utility. Consequently, this survey collects unique information, including respondents' preference parameters and psychological personalities and attributes, in addition to their basic socio-economic characteristics. In our analysis, we investigated the effect of blood types on blood-donation behavior after controlling for such characteristics, and then we checked whether these characteristics differ across blood groups.
Furthermore, we sought to reconfirm the advantages of using the PPSOU dataset by comparing it with a dataset used in a related study. Again, our Japanese survey respondents consisted of both blood donors and nonblood donors. In addition, the survey collected information concerning respondents' behavioral economics preferences and psychological attributes. These features enabled us to avoid a potential sample-selection problem and to test whether pure altruism and a large number of potential recipients motivate an individual's blood donation behavior, after dealing empirically with the possibility that other explanations may also be valid.
Empirical Strategy
Variables and model specifications
We used a simple model specification for analysis, as shown in equation (1):
where represents a constant term, and represents an error term.
The dependent variable, , explains respondent i's blooddonation behavior. More precisely, we employed the following two dependent variables:
the first represents respondents who have donated blood at least once within the past few years, and the second represented those who had donated blood once or more within the past year. Since these two variables are binary, we used logistic regression for the estimation. In addition, we applied to the estimation a sampling weight and robust standard errors clustered at the prefecture level.
The main independent variable, , expressed respondent i's blood type. These were dummy variables for example, the dummy-coded variable of blood type O was coded as a "1" if a respondent i's blood type is O and was coded as a "0" for the other blood types. This dummy-coding was done for each of the blood types. Here, note that respondents cannot select their blood type in a biological sense, and are exogenous variables. Therefore, we can determine the starting point of the effect from blood types to blood donation behaviors, when using a cross-sectional dataset and a simple logistic regression model.
As for covariates, we added to the model. We used these to control the effects of socio-economic status, health status, and preferences and psychological characteristics.
In the next subsection labeled "descriptive statistics," we discuss the information in more detail.
Our analysis procedure was as follows: First, we performed equation (1) with a full sample, clarifying the relationship between blood types and blood-donation behaviors.
If a different pattern of blood-donation behaviors was found for people with blood type O, we then investigated whether such a result is generated because blood type O is a public good with a wider population of potential recipients than the other blood types.
For this latter analysis, we performed equation (1) , which is a similar percentage to that shown in our sample. Also, as we have already mentioned in Section 2, the distribution of blood type across Japan is consistent with that in our sample.
In addition, Table 1 introduces the sample's variables in regard to socio-economic status, health status, and preferences and psychological characteristics. Note that the lowest age in our sample is 27 years old, which is due to the fact that the PPSOU is a panel survey, meaning that it has surveyed the same respondents since the first wave in 2003. Therefore, our sample does not include any members of the general population's 16-26 age group, who can legally donate blood. Nevertheless, the rate of blood donation among younger generations is showing a declining trend and, at present, people in their forties are the primary blood donors. In addition, the oldest age in our sample is 70 years old, as 69 years old is the oldest age at which people in Japan can donate blood. Thus, our sample includes those who were 69 years old or younger the year before our survey (2016).
As a consequence, we advanced 1,311 responses from the 2017 PPSOU survey to the analysis phase. See Appendix for more details of questions and variables in particular of health status, preferences, and psychological characteristics.
Results
Basic Results
[Insert Table 2 here]
This section considers the relationships between blood types and blood-donation behaviors. Table 2 shows the basic results of our performance of equation (1) using the full sample. In all the columns (1) to (4), the estimated parameter of the blood type O dummy variable was positive and statistically significant, which indicates that people with blood type O were more likely to have donated blood at least once within the past few years than were people with other blood types. In particular, column (4) shows that they were especially more likely to have done so than people with blood type A, whose blood donation behaviors were similar to those of people with blood types B or AB. These findings are consistent with one prediction of Andreoni's theory 7 in these cases, the positive income effect overcomes the negative crowding-out effect. When evaluating the marginal effect, the likelihood to have donated blood within the past few years was 4.0% (5.0%) higher in the people with blood type O than in people with the other blood types (in particular, the people with blood type A).
These results remained stable also when using another dependent variable, which represented respondents who had donated blood once or more within the past year. In addition, estimations using the probit regression model and the linear probability model produced similar results.
Interestingly, column (8) shows that the people with blood type AB were more likely to have donated blood once or more within the past year than were people with blood type A. Although this finding might be confusing at first glance, it also can be interpreted by considering Andreoni's theory 7 , which indicates that, in the case of a decrease in the number of potential recipients, the income effect becomes negative and the opposite effect to crowding out occurs. Therefore, it is possible that when the opposite effect prevails over the negative income effect, the people with blood type AB are more likely to have donated blood. When the group size is small, donors might think that they are among a few who are able to donate blood to a small number of the recipients.
However, since this tendency is not observed in column (4), it does not seem to be robust.
Thus, we found that the people with blood type O donated their blood differently than did people with the other blood types, as we expected. Following our analysis procedure, the second step was to investigate whether they did so because blood type O is a public good with a wider population of potential recipients than the other blood types.
[Insert Table 3 here] Table 3 shows the results of performing equation (1) 
Further Results
This section examines (and rejects) the other possible explanations for our results. In so doing, we further confirm our interpretations of the results. First, we arrest the concern that people with blood type O are more likely to donate their blood because they have more altruistic personalities. We wish to restate that our model specification included covariates related to preferences and psychological characteristics, including altruism and considered their potential differences across blood groups: however, it is possible that these covariates failed to sufficiently control for the differences. If unobserved altruistic factors remained after controlling the covariates and if the blood type O dummy was a proxy variable for the factors, the blood type O dummy should have had a statistically and significantly positive effect not only on blood-donation behaviors but also on the other altruistic behaviors.
[Insert Table 4 here] captured the respondents' current health condition however, these variables might have failed to represent differences in terms of congenital or chronic health conditions. Consequently, to address this concern, we performed equation ( Table 5 . As these results are robustly similar to those previously obtained, we can suppose that this second concern is not a significant factor.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The third concern is that the people with blood type O may be more likely to donate their blood because blood type O is more in demand than other blood types. For example, blood-donor centers might frequently make requests that people with blood type O donate blood. To consider a (possible) difference in demand in this regard, we controlled for information relating to the inventory ratio of stocks of each blood type in each respondents' prefecture. When the inventory ratio of stocks of a particular blood type is low in a prefecture, it is likely that the blood-donor centers in the area make requests that people with that blood type donate their blood. In 2012, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in Japan published weekly reports concerning the inventory ratios of stocks of blood types for all prefectures 22 and, using this information, we created variables relating to the annual averages and standard deviations of these inventory ratios of stocks in each respondent's prefecture.
[Insert Table 6 here] Table 6 shows that O blood type's parameter remained positive and statistically significant even after controlling for information concerning the inventory ratio of stocks for each blood group. Therefore, this third concern is not crucial.
The fourth and final concern is that people with blood type O Rh-negative may be more likely to donate blood, and this behavior consequently shapes our results. It is well known that the blood type O Rh-negative is quite rare and, therefore, people with this blood type might think that provided donations of this blood type are also rare. This rarity could make them more likely to donate their blood to others within the same group.
Consequently, this has the potential to negate our hypothesis.
It is unlikely that the above concern is valid, although our survey did not capture whether a respondent had Rh positive or negative blood and we cannot directly control its effect in our estimations. According to the Japanese Red Cross Tokyo Metropolitan Blood Center, only 0.15% of the Japanese population has O Rh-negative blood (a proportion of 1:670 people) 23 . Therefore, our blood type O sample included very few people with blood type O Rh-negative. Even if there were such individuals in the sample, their proportion is likely to have been extremely small (i.e. approximately up to 2 people in the sample), meaning they would not have greatly influenced our estimation results.
As an illustration, we shall imagine that there existed 2 peoplewith blood type O Rhnegative, and both have donated their blood. Even after excluding the two observations, the ratio of blood donors among the people with blood type O is 14.6%, which is almost indifferent from that in the full sample (15.1%).
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Preferences and psychological characteristics
Behavioral economics preferences (1) Big 5 personality traits (1) Note: See Appendix for more details of questions and variables in particular of health status, preferences, and psychological characteristics. Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1. The baseline in columns (1)- (3) and (5)- (7) is blood type A, B, or AB. The baseline in columns (4) and (8) is blood type A. When evaluating the marginal effect, the likelihood to have donated blood within the past few years was 4.0% (5.0%) higher in the people with blood type O than in people with the other blood types (in particular, the people with blood type A). Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1. The baseline in columns (1)(3)(5)(7) is blood type A, B, or AB. The baseline in columns (2)(4)(6)(8) is blood type A. All the model specifications include covariates of socio-economic status, health status, and preferences and psychological attributes.
970
Group who knew and believed that blood type O can be medically transfused into individuals of all blood groups
The group who did not know and believe that blood type O can be medically transfused into individuals of all blood groups Notes: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1. Since the dependent variables in rows (1) to (5) are binary, we estimate these equations, using logistic regression. For the experience of monetary donations in rows (6) to (8), the original question items are as follows: "not making a donation", "1 yen ~ 5,000 yen", ..., "500,000 yen ~ 1,000,000 yen", "1,000,000 yen or more". Therefore, when the dependent variable is experience of monetary donation, we estimate these equations, using interval regression. The altruistic characteristics in rows (9) to (12) are ordinal variables whose values are 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1. Therefore, we regard them as continuous variables and estimate these equations. Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1. The baseline in columns (1)(3)(5)(7) is blood type A, B, or AB. The baseline in columns (2)(4)(6)(8) is blood type A. All the model specifications include covariates of socio-economic status, health status, and preferences and psychological attributes.
1,077 930
We excluded the respondents who answered: "I have donated blood before, but I have not donated within the past few years because of my health."
We excluded the respondents who answered: "I have donated blood before, but I have not donated within the past few years because of my health," or "I want to donate blood, but I cannot because of my health." Note: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1. All the model specifications include covariates of socio-economic status, health status, and preferences and psychological attributes. The baseline in columns (1)(2)(4)(5) is blood type A, B, or AB. The baseline in columns (3)(6) is blood type A. Note: First, we reconstructed the answers on the opposite scale from 1 to 5, where "1" means "it doesn't hold true at all for you" and "5" means "it is particularly true for you." Second, we calculated out the indicator of mental illness, by summing up the answers for the fours statements and dividing the value by 4.
Preferences
a) Time discounting factor: Suppose that you are to receive money from someone. You can either choose to receive the money today, or 7 days from today, but the amounts will be different. Compare the amounts and dates below in Option "A" and Option "B," and indicate which option you prefer for each of the nine choices. Notes: As similarly in previous studies 1 , we asked the respondents to choose between two options, "A" and "B." For example, we asked them to choose between "A"-receiving today JPY 3,005, and "B"-receiving in 7days JPY 5,951. From each situation, we obtained response data, which revealed the switching point, where each respondent switched his or her choice from option "A" to "B." At the switching point, the today's option is equivalent to the delayed option.
We calculate out time discounting factor using the following way. We first take the average of the two monetary amounts for Option A at the point of switching from Option B to Option A. Second, we divide the numerator by the average of the two monetary amounts for Option B at the switching point.
b) Absolute risk aversion: Suppose that there is a "speed lottery" with a 50% chance of winning JPY 100,000 (USD 1,000). If you win, you receive a prize right away. If you lose, you receive nothing. How much would you spend to buy a ticket for this lottery?
Choose Option "A" if you would buy the ticket at that price, or choose Option "B" if you would not.
Price of the "speed lottery" ticket
Which ONE do you prefer? Option A (buy the "speed lottery" ticket) Notes: we use answers for a hypothetical question related to a speed lottery and measure a respondent's risk tolerance from absolutely risk neutral to absolutely risk averse. This approach to elicit risk aversion using a hypothetical lottery is also taken by previous studies 2,3,4 .
Specifically, this question asks respondents about their willingness to pay ( ) for a hypothetical lottery with a 50 percent chance of winning JPY 100,000 (USD 1,000) or nothing otherwise. Since the expected value of the lottery is JPY 50,000
(USD 500), we interpret this to mean that a respondent whose is lower than the expected value is more risk averse. We calculate the indicator of absolute risk aversion using the following equation:
Absolute Risk Aversion = 50,000 − 0.5 0.5 × 100,000 − 2 × 0.5 × 100,000 × + means "it doesn't hold true at all for you" and "5" means "it is particularly true for
